proceeded from it, for example, the world, then this is only because there was no factor favoring existence; rather, the world’s existence through it was a sheer possibility. If the world then comes into being, one of two things must be the case: either a determining factor newly arises or none does. If none arises, the world remains a sheer possibility, just as it was before. If a determining factor newly arises, the same question applies to that factor: why did it favor existence now and not before? Either this proceeds to infinity, or it ultimately reaches a determining factor that has always been determining.”

[Ibn Rushd’s response to al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya’s commentary]

Ibn Rushd said:

“This argument belongs to the highest ranks of dialectic, but it does not attain the level of demonstration, because its premises are general, and general premises border on equivocal ones. Demonstrative premises, by contrast, concern essential matters appropriate to their subject. For ‘possible’ is applied equivocally to what occurs in most cases, what occurs in few cases, and what is equally likely to occur or not. Their need for a determining factor is not equally evident: what occurs in most cases may be thought to be favored by its own nature, rather than by an external determining factor, unlike what is equally likely either way.