and this possible nonexistent is not possible insofar as it is known, nor insofar as it exists in actuality, but only insofar as it exists potentially.

For this reason, the Mu‘tazila said that the nonexistent is an entity of some kind. Nonexistence is opposed to existence, and each replaces the other: when a thing’s nonexistence ceases, its existence takes its place; and when its existence ceases, its nonexistence takes its place.

Since nonexistence itself cannot turn into existence, nor existence itself into nonexistence, that which receives both must be a third thing distinct from them. It is this that is characterized by possibility, coming-to-be, and transition from nonexistence to existence. For nonexistence is not characterized by coming-to-be and change, nor is that which exists in actuality so characterized.” He discussed this at length.

He also said, concerning their well-known argument for the eternity of the world, namely their assertion:

“It is impossible for something originated in time to proceed from what is absolutely eternal, for if we posit the eternal and there has not