each element of the multiplicity in the first effect is itself a first principle, in which case they must admit a plurality of first principles.”

He said:

“What is utterly astonishing is how this escaped Abū Nasr and Ibn Sīnā! They were the first to propound these absurdities; people then followed them and attributed this view to the philosophers. For if they say that the multiplicity in the second principle arises only from what it apprehends of itself and what it apprehends of another, they must admit that its essence has two natures—that is, two forms. I should like to know: which of the two emanates from the First Principle, and which does not?”

He said:

“The same applies when they say of it, ‘It is contingent in itself and necessary through another.’ For the contingent nature must necessarily differ from the necessary nature it acquires from the Necessary Existent, since the contingent nature cannot become