contingent beings came into existence without a Necessary Existent, or that the existence of each of the two beings necessary in themselves is complete only through the other, along with other untenable implications of their discourse.

The point here is to show that the best of what is found in Ibn Sīnā’s discourse was learned from innovators among the Muslim speculative theologians, despite their own innovations and shortcomings.

When al-Ghazālī presented several arguments against their assertion, “From one, only one emanates,” demonstrating its falsity, Ibn Rushd said:

“If the philosophers believe that there is multiplicity in the first effect, they must necessarily be asked: Where did the multiplicity in the first effect come from? Just as they say that many cannot emanate from one, they must likewise accept that multiplicity cannot emanate from one. Thus their assertion, ‘From one, only one emanates,’ contradicts their assertion that what emanated from the First One is something containing multiplicity—unless they say that