Al-Rāzī also discussed some of this in al-Arba‘īn, Nihāyat al-‘Uqūl, al-Matālib al-‘Āliya, al-Muhassal, and other works.

These thinkers divided existence into necessary and contingent, meaning by ‘contingent’ that which has a cause. They included within the contingent that which is eternal, beginningless, necessary, and necessarily existent, and which cannot fail to exist. They must therefore demonstrate that this contingent being necessarily depends on a Necessary Existent. Yet they established this only by arguing that whatever comes into being depends on an agent.

This is true, but it demonstrates the existence of an eternal, beginningless being; it does not demonstrate that eternal, beginningless beings fall into the categories of necessary and contingent, as they claimed.

Since they did not establish this contingent being, and the Necessary Existent can be established only once it has been established, they established neither a necessary existent nor a contingent existent. Nor was the division of existence into necessary and contingent established according to their terminology. At most, they establish the Necessary Existent under either supposition, even if the contingent is not established. For if the contingent is established, then the Necessary Existent has been established; and if it is not established, the other category remains—namely, the necessary—since there is no middle ground between negation and affirmation.

We have said:

“An existent either has a cause or has no cause. An effect must have a cause. Thus, under either supposition, the existence of that which has no cause necessarily follows, and this is what was to be proved.”

They are told:

This does not help you, for two reasons.

First, you have not established the existence of anything without a cause, and merely making this division does not demonstrate it. Rather, you have allowed that an eternal, beginningless existent may be an effect.

On this supposition,