Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (8/176)

otherwise, the mere division is an unsupported claim. It is like saying that existence is divided into what exists and what does not exist; or into the eternal, that which comes into being, and that which is neither; or into the necessary, the contingent, and that which is neither necessary nor contingent. Such a division turns on negation and affirmation, but does not entail that every category exists.

If it is said, “Existence is divided into what has a cause and what has no cause,” and then, “What has a cause is divided into the genuinely contingent—which is what comes into being—and the contingent in Ibn Sīnā’s terminology—which is what has a cause despite being necessary,” then, having established the division of what has a cause into the necessary and that which comes into being, he would at most have established the existence of these two categories, or the existence of a necessary being that has a cause. This does not establish a necessary being without a cause, which is the Necessary Existent in itself. Thus, what he has stated does not establish the Necessary Existent in itself. How could it, when it does not even establish a necessary being that has a cause, but merely divides what has a cause into the necessary and the non-necessary?

Merely dividing something into two categories does not demonstrate that both exist. Thus, what he has stated establishes neither a necessary being that has a cause nor one that has no cause, unless he shows that what comes into being points to this. Yet he has not argued from coming into being at all, although what comes into being is the genuinely contingent. Rather, he has argued from the notion of the contingent that he invented, making it encompass both the eternal and necessary and that which comes into being. Had he argued from what comes into being, it would have established something eternal. But establishing something eternal does not establish the Necessary Existent in their terminology, since, according to them, the eternal is divided into the necessary and the contingent.

وإلا فمجرد التقسيم دعوى مجردة، كما لو قيل: الوجود ينقسم إلى ماهو ثابت، وإلى ما ليس بثابت، أو ينقسم إلى قديم وحادث، وما ليس بقديم ولا حادث، أو ينقسم إلى واجب وممكن، وما ليس بواجب ولا ممكن. فهذا تقسيم دائر بين النفي والإثبات، لكن لا يستلزم ثبوت كل من الأقسام. وإذا قيل: ينقسم إلى معلول وغير معلول. وقيل: المعلول ينقسم إلى ممكن حقيقي - وهو الحادث وإلى ممكن باصطلاح ابن سينا - وهو المعلول - مع كونه ضرورياً، كان غايته إذ أثبت انقسام المعلول إلى ضروري وحادث: إثبات القسمين: الضروري والحادث، أو إثبات ضروري معلول، ليس في إثبات ضروري ليس بمعلول، وهو واجب الوجود بنفسه، فلم يكن فيما ذكره إثبات واجب الوجود بنفسه، فكيف وليس فيه أيضاً إثبات ضروري معلول، وإنما فيه تقسيم المعلول إلى ضروري وغير ضروري؟. ومجرد التقسيم لا يدل على ثبوت كل من القسمين، فلم يكن فيما ذكره لا إثبات ضروري معلول ولا غير معلول، إن لم يبين أن المحدث يدل على ذلك، ولا استدل بالحدوث ألبته، وهو الممكن الحقيقي، وإنما استدل بالممكن الذي ابتدعه، وجعله يتناول القديم الضروري والمحدث ولو استدل بالمحدث لدل على إثبات قديم، وثبوت قديم لا يدل على واجب الوجود باصطلاحهم لأن القديم عندهم ينقسم إلى واجب وممكن.