Sīnā to generalize this proposition and define the contingent as that which has a cause, as Abū Hāmid mentioned.”

I say:

He has thus explained that the statement that the contingent must have an agent is sound, since, according to the generality of rational people, philosophers and others alike, the contingent is that which comes into being, and whatever comes into being must have an agent. This, too, is known, clear, and accepted among the generality of rational people.

As for his statement:

“It contains no falsehood except for their assumption that the world in its entirety is contingent, for this is not self-evident. Ibn Sīnā therefore sought to generalize this proposition and define the contingent as that which has a cause.”

What he means is that those thinkers understood the contingent to mean that which comes into being, whereas it is not self-evident that the entire world came into being. Ibn Sīnā therefore sought to define the contingent as that which has a cause, so that he could establish on this basis that the entire world is contingent and has an eternal, beginningless cause.

Those who learned philosophy from Ibn Sīnā’s writings suppose that this view he expressed is the view of Aristotle and his followers. That is not so; rather, it is reported from Proclus. Thus he said:

“The Creator is generous, and the cause of His generosity is His own essence; His generosity is therefore abiding.”

This accords with Ibn Sīnā’s view, but not with Aristotle’s. For, according to Aristotle, the First Principle performs no act—whether of generosity or otherwise—and has no will; indeed, He does not even know anything other than Himself.

As for Ibn Rushd’s statement:

“That the world in its entirety is contingent is not self-evident.”