infinitely many bodies simultaneously entails that what is infinite should form a whole and exist in actuality, which is impossible. Time, however, has no spatial position, so the existence of bodies one above another without end does not entail the actual existence of an infinite multitude—which is what they regard as impossible.”

Then, after mentioning the demonstration that Abū Hāmid reported from the philosophers concerning the impossibility of an infinite series of causes, Ibn Rushd said:

“Ibn Sīnā was the first to introduce this demonstration, which he attributes to the philosophers, into philosophy, presenting it as a better method than that of the ancients. He claimed that it proceeds from the very essence of what exists, whereas their methods proceed from accidental properties consequent upon the First Principle. Ibn Sīnā borrowed this method from the theologians. They regard it as self-evident that what exists is divided into the contingent and the necessary. They posited that whatever is contingent must have an agent and that, since the world as a whole is contingent, its agent must be a necessary existent. This was the belief of the Mu‘tazilah before the Ash‘ariyyah. It is a sound argument containing nothing false except their assumption that the world as a whole is contingent, for this is not self-evident. Ibn Sīnā therefore sought to generalize this