This resolves many of the specious arguments found in the writings of al-Rāzī and other logicians, and of others who have misunderstood this issue.

[Is Allah’s existence His essence, or is it additional to His essence?]

Their misunderstanding of this issue has left them perplexed about the existence of Allah Most High: is it His essence, or is it additional to His essence? And is the term “existence” n predicated univocally and in varying degrees, or is it merely equivocal?

They say:

If we say that the term “existence” is merely equivocal, it follows that existence cannot be divided into necessary and contingent existence. This contradicts what rational people agree upon and what is known through clear reason.

If we say that it is univocal or predicated in varying degrees, it follows that existing things share what the term “existence” denotes. Existence would thus be common to the necessary being and contingent beings. This shared existence would then require something to distinguish the existence of one from that of another. The distinction would lie in their respective realities, so the existence of each would be additional to its essence. Necessary existence would therefore depend upon something other than itself.

They repeat what al-Rāzī and his followers say: that people hold only three views concerning the existence of the Lord Most High. The first is that the term “existence” is predicated only equivocally.

The second is that the existence of the necessary being is additional to His essence.

The third is that He is absolute existence, having no reality other than existence subject to the condition that every positive essence be denied of Him.

[Ibn Taymiyya’s view]

They should be told:

All three views are false, and the true view is none of these three.

The root of their error is their supposition that, if we say existence is divided into necessary and contingent existence, there must be an externally existing existence that is itself the necessary being and is itself