nor can it be necessary of itself when each of its members is possible, for their coming together is an accident dependent upon possible things, and is thus even more evidently possible than they are.

If someone were to ask:

“How, then, can you describe the whole as impossible when each of its members is possible? Does this not ascribe impossibility to the whole but not to its individual members?”

The reply would be:

We do not suppose that an infinite series of causes and effects exists externally and then judge it to be impossible, for that would combine two contradictories. Its existence externally would be incompatible with its impossibility. Rather, we conceive of it in the mind and then judge what is thus conceived to be impossible externally, like the combination of two contradictories and other such impossibilities.

This differs from supposing that they exist externally and that each is possible, and then saying, “The whole is necessary of itself.” This is what is impossible, just as describing the whole as impossible under those same assumptions is impossible. Conceiving of them in the mind is not sufficient for possible things to exist, because a possible thing can exist only through something that exists externally, not something merely conceived in the mind.

This differs from supposing an infinite number of things, each coming after another: it does not follow that the whole comes after something else. Such is the case with future events in Paradise. Each comes after another, but the whole does not come after something else; rather, it continues