the whole is subject to the same judgment as its individual members. The first case is exemplified by ascribing existence, nonexistence, necessity, possibility, or impossibility to them. If infinitely many things are posited, each of which exists, the whole also exists.

If each is assumed to exist concurrently with the others, the whole exists concurrently; if their existence is assumed to be successive, the existence of the whole is successive.

If each is assumed to be nonexistent, the whole is also nonexistent. If each is assumed to be nonexistent at the same time as the others, they are nonexistent together; if each is assumed to be nonexistent after another, their nonexistence is successive.

Thus, successive events that cease to exist after coming into existence—such as movements—are successive both in their existence and in their nonexistence. The whole, likewise, exists successively and is nonexistent successively.

If infinitely many impossible things are posited, the whole is impossible. If infinitely many necessary things are posited, the whole is likewise necessary. Similarly, if infinitely many things are posited, none of which exists of itself, but each of which depends on something else, then dependence, need, and possibility must apply to the whole just as they apply to each of its individual members. Likewise, existence, nonexistence, necessity, and impossibility apply to the whole according to how they apply to its individual members. Thus, the whole can only be dependent, in need, and possible; it cannot be nonexistent when each of its members exists,