a limit in both, as do many speculative theologians, including the Muʿtazilah and those who agree with them.

Some of these rule out an infinite series in both the eternal past and the eternal future, as held by Jahm and al-ʿAllāf. Most, however, rule it out in the eternal past but not in the eternal future, because the endless duration of the bliss of Paradise is part of the Muslim faith. Thus, Jahm held that the bliss of Paradise would come to an end, while al-ʿAllāf held that their movements would cease.

The second view rules out an infinite series of agents and causes, but not of events and effects. This is the view of the majority of philosophers, both those who affirm that the world came into existence and those who affirm its eternity. It is also the view of groups among the speculative theologians, including the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿarīs, and of the majority of the people of hadith and the leading authorities of the Sunnah.

In arguing that the proof advanced by those who rule out an infinite series is invalid, Abū Hāmid maintained that what holds true of individual members does not necessarily hold true of the whole, as these thinkers argued concerning events. This is contrary to the position of Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and other speculative theologians, who held that what holds true of individual members holds true of the whole. Abū Hāmid then treated the two cases alike.

Elsewhere, we have discussed the distinction between the two cases: if an attribute applies to the whole in the same way that it applies to its individual members, the whole is subject to the same judgment as its individual members. But if it does not apply to the whole in the same way that it applies to its individual members, it does not follow that