pure and simple, who say that the world is necessarily existent in itself. This will be discussed later, Allah Most High willing.

The second ground on which Abū Hāmid refuted their method is that it rests on ruling out an endless series of causes and effects. He argued that they could not rule this out while affirming an endless succession of events, as he has already explained.

Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī established the Necessary Existent only on the basis of this premise. Thus, Abū Hāmid’s argument invalidated the method of all of them.

Al-Āmidī agreed with Abū Hāmid about the weakness of the argument for denying a limit to causes. Consequently, he did not establish the existence of the Necessary Existent in his discussion. Rather, he established it in his book al-Afkār by a method that he invalidated in his book Rumūz al-Kunūz. We have explained elsewhere why his objection is unsound.

Nothing in what Abū Hāmid and al-Āmidī said invalidates the method of the Muʿtazilah and those who agree with them, based on the principle that something’s coming into existence at one of two times rather than the other requires a determining factor. That method does not depend on ruling out an infinite regress of causes and effects.

The central point of Abū Hāmid’s argument is that there is no difference between an endless succession of events and an endless series of causes: you allow the former, so allow the latter.

People hold two views on this matter. The first is the view of those who rule out the absence of