another, or are ordered by nature, as causes and effects are. Souls, however, are not like this.

We reply:

This is an arbitrary stipulation, no more justified than its reverse. Why have you deemed one of the two cases impossible but not the other? What proof establishes the distinction?

On what grounds can you reject the claim that these infinitely numerous souls are not without an order, since some existed before others? Past days and nights are infinite in number. If we suppose that one soul came into existence each day and night, the souls now existing would be infinite in number and ordered according to their coming into existence—that is, some after others.

At most, a cause can be said to precede its effect by nature, just as it is said to be above its effect in essence, not in place. If this is not impossible in the case of actual temporal priority, it should not be impossible in the case of essential, natural priority.

Why do they disallow an infinite succession of bodies situated spatially above one another, yet allow an infinite succession of beings preceding one another in time? Is this anything but a hollow, arbitrary stipulation with no foundation?”