the discussion of divine oneness and the denial of attributes that follows the present discussion.

The second aspect, which concerns this particular question, is to say: Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that these beings have a cause, but that their cause itself has a cause, and the cause of that cause has a cause in turn, and so on without end.

Your claim that an infinite series of causes is impossible is inconsistent with your own position. For we ask: Is your knowledge of this immediate and necessary, or is it reached through inference? You cannot claim immediate, necessary knowledge; and every line of reasoning you have advanced is invalidated by your allowing a beginningless succession of events.

If an infinite number of things can come into existence, why should it be implausible that some are causes of others, with the series terminating at one end in an effect that has no further effect, but not terminating at the other in a cause that has no cause? Just as time