do so, there would have been no more reason for it to come into being than not to, were it not for something that required it to come into being.

Thus, Abū al-Husayn’s statement:

“There would have been no more reason for it to come into being than not to, were it not for something that required it to come into being,”

makes clear that the preponderance of coming into being over not coming into being requires something to give it that preponderance.

Thus, despite its length, this method would be better than that of Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, and others like them—even if their method were sound—for two reasons:

The first is that the need for something to account for the preponderance of the existence of what comes into being over its nonexistence is more evident to reason than the dependence of every contingent being on such a factor. For various groups have disputed the reality of a contingent being presumed not to have come into being, the possibility of its being an effect of something else, and similar matters.

Indeed, rational people generally hold such a being to be impossible; those who affirm it acknowledge its impossibility, and sound reason demonstrates its impossibility. They have offered no proof of its reality, of its dependence on a necessary existent, or of the existence of a necessary existent constituting a category coordinate with it.