its nonexistence, insofar as it is contingent. If either takes precedence, this is due to the presence or absence of something. Thus, every contingent existent derives its existence from something else.”

His statement, “Whatever is contingent does not come into existence of itself,” is a true and self-evident proposition, for the contingent is that whose existence is through itself.

To say, “Whatever does not exist of itself derives its existence from something else,” is to state a self-evident proposition. Yet this is known—indeed, can only be established—in things that come into being, existing at one time and not existing at another, as he himself, his predecessors, and all rational people have acknowledged. For whatever admits of both existence and nonexistence must have come into being.

We have cited his words and those of others elsewhere. They have been unable to demonstrate dependence upon an agent except in the case of things that come into being.

As for his attempt to establish this through his statement, “Its existence, in itself, has no priority over its nonexistence, insofar as it is contingent,” this is unnecessary, disputed, and something for which he has offered no proof. Rather, one may say that, considered in itself, nonexistence has greater claim to it than existence. Indeed, considered solely in itself, nothing but nonexistence is its due.

Indeed, one may say that this is false: whatever depends upon an agent to bring it into being is necessarily known not to exist except through the agent that brings it into being. Its nonexistence, however, depends upon nothing. Everything that admits of existence and nonexistence can exist only through something that brings it into existence; its nonexistence, however, requires nothing.

His statement, “If either occurs, this is due to the presence or absence of something,” is likewise unnecessary. He has not demonstrated it, nor is it conceded; rather, it is false. A contingent thing depends upon something else only when it exists. As for something that remains nonexistent, its continued nonexistence requires nothing. His statement amounts to saying that existence occurs because something else is present, while nonexistence occurs because something else is absent. Thus, it would be nonexistent only because its cause is absent. As has already been explained, this statement is not self-evident and is disputed; indeed, it is false. Careful examination shows that the nonexistence of the other thing entails its nonexistence and is evidence of it, rather than being what necessitates its nonexistence.

The statements of Judge Abū Bakr, Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī, and others like them on this