that which brings about change in the celestial spheres, except by claiming that the necessary existent cannot be composite, because a composite depends upon its parts, and whatever depends upon its parts cannot be necessarily existent.

It is well known that this merely rules out the necessity of a necessary existent understood as an isolated entity, neither an attribute nor a bearer of attributes, and that such an entity cannot bear attributes—even though the premise is that it does not bear attributes.

Yet no proof has established the existence of this necessary existent, or even its possibility. Rather, proof establishes its impossibility.

What is meant by this is the dependence of what is produced upon its producer, and of what is known upon its efficient cause. What is intended, however, is only that the existence of a composite entails the existence of its parts; thus, the existence of an entity possessing attributes entails the existence of both the entity and its attributes.

There is nothing objectionable in this. In essence, it means that a thing’s possessing attributes entails its possessing attributes, and that its being composite entails its being composite.

This statement is correct, but it contains nothing indicating that such a thing is impossible. This has been discussed at length elsewhere.

Al-Ghazālī and others recognized some of the grounds on which their argument fails. We have discussed these, as well as other considerations that demonstrate the falsity of their argument.

The purpose here is to explain that the approach of the former is better than that of the latter.

All of this demonstrates that the closer someone is to Islam, the sounder his rational arguments concerning divine matters are than those of someone further removed from Islam—except where, in his rational arguments, he follows someone further removed from Islam than himself.

All this is clear