It is thus clear that the approach of those speculative thinkers among the Muslim theologians—despite the unnecessary elaboration and circuitous reasoning they employed, which may even have been harmful—was better than the approach of these others, who argued from the preponderance of one of the two alternatives for a contingent thing.

Moreover, Ibn Sīnā and those like him were better in this respect than al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and those like them. Al-Rāzī, in turn, was better in this respect than al-Āmidī, as has been explained elsewhere.

All this assumes that this approach—the approach of Ibn Sīnā and those who followed him, such as al-Rāzī and others—is sound. What, then, if it is invalid?! We have discussed it at length elsewhere and explained that this approach does not establish at all the existence in external reality of a necessary existent distinct from the contingent. Even if it did establish that, it would not establish that this necessary existent is distinct from the celestial spheres and the like.

Hence, those who follow this approach cannot use it to establish the Maker’s existence. Even if they could establish the Maker’s existence through it, they could not establish that He is anything other than the celestial spheres, let alone establish their claim that He is not composite—a claim they made the basis for denying His attributes.

This is because they based this approach on the premise that whatever exists is either necessary or contingent, and that the contingent must have a necessary existent. They therefore needed to establish two things: that the division into the necessary and the contingent is exhaustive, and that the contingent entails the necessary.

The term “necessary” is ambiguous. It may refer to that which exists of itself, which