As for the claim that its nonexistence cannot prevail over its existence without a determining cause, this is disputed; most rational thinkers hold the opposite view. They maintain that nonexistence is neither caused nor itself a cause. This view was expressed by certain affirmationist theologians and others, including al-Qādī Abū Bakr and his followers, such as Abū al-Ma‘ālī, al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others.

The majority therefore maintain that a contingent thing’s nonexistence requires no cause. Rather, it has no existence of itself; if there is no cause necessitating its existence, it remains nonexistent.

If someone says, “Its nonexistence is due to the absence of the cause of its existence, just as its existence is due to the presence of the cause of its existence,” they reply:

“Do you mean that the very absence of the cause necessitates its nonexistence, just as the cause necessitating its existence—such as an agent—necessitates its existence? Or do you mean that the absence of the cause entails its nonexistence and serves as evidence of its nonexistence?

“The first is rejected; the second is conceded.”

This is because its nonexistence has no need whatsoever of an external cause, and whatever has no need of an external cause is not causally explained by one. Its essence does not entail nonexistence, which would make it impossible; rather, it does not necessitate existence. Its nonexistence therefore continues so long as there is no cause necessitating its existence. Nevertheless, the absence of the necessitating cause serves as evidence of the absence of what it necessitates, because its existence without a cause is impossible.

Thus, when we know that there is no cause necessitating its existence, we know that it does not exist. This is