cannot have either of its two alternatives prevail over the other without a determining cause, we find the former more evident.’

We reply:

This is disputed. Even if it is conceded, the fact that the former is more evident does not mean that the latter is not evident. Self-evident truths differ in their clarity, just as truths established through reasoning differ in their obscurity. Just as such differences do not prevent the latter from being established through reasoning, they do not prevent the former from being self-evident.

His statement:

‘A number of scholars have affirmed that a contingent thing can occur without a cause. Had the falsity of this been self-evident, they would not have maintained it.’

We reply:

They did not affirm this. At most, it follows from their doctrines, and not everything that follows from a doctrine is necessarily accepted by its adherent.

The difficulty arises only from his accepting something that contradicts this proposition, not merely from its following from his position. Likewise, whenever you confront the adherents of these doctrines with the implication that a contingent thing occurs without a cause, they seek ways