that whatever comes into being must be contingent, since that which does not admit actual nonexistence cannot at any time be reckoned as having come into being.

The second is that neither of the two alternatives for a contingent thing can prevail over the other without a determining cause.

No rational person doubts these two premises. The doubts you have mentioned are comparable to the sophists’ objections against all other self-evident truths. Just as those objections, despite their force, do not undermine any self-evident truths or deprive us of certainty and confidence in our observations, neither do the objections you have mentioned.”

He said:

“This is a decisive answer for anyone who is fair-minded.”

He said:

“The second approach is to answer the doubts mentioned in detail.”

He went on to say:

“His statement: ‘If it is established that things which come into being are contingent, it necessarily follows