the particular time rather than at any other time, not because of anything peculiar to that time.

Those among them who explain this by saying that this particular time has a hidden benefit maintain that this benefit belongs exclusively to that time, rather than to any of the other times mentioned, although they are all alike. This would therefore amount to a contingent thing occurring without a cause.

The second is that those who hold that motives and accidents cannot be attributed to Allah Most High, and deny that goodness and badness are properties of the act itself, say that Allah Most High assigned a particular ruling to a particular case—obligation, recommendation, prohibition, or permission—even though all other cases are equivalent to it. Thus, according to their position, there is no specific cause for assigning that ruling exclusively to that case.

The third is that most have claimed that an agent capable of acting may do one thing rather than its opposite, despite having equal motives for both, without any determining factor. Indeed, they have claimed that someone fleeing a predatory beast who encounters two paths equal in every respect must choose one rather than the other, and they have claimed that knowledge of this