Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

must have a cause. He then raised the following objection:

“Why do you say that whatever is contingent must have a cause?

There are two lines of inquiry here.

The first is to say: At this point, you must take one of two positions: either claim that this is self-evident or that it is established by inference.

The claim that it is self-evident is invalid for two reasons.

First, if we present to the intellect the proposition that neither of the two alternatives of a contingent thing can prevail over the other without a determining factor, and also present the proposition that one is half of two, we do not find the first proposition as compelling as the second.

Second, rational people have admitted the possibility of something contingent occurring without a cause. Had this principle been self-evident, it would have been impossible for rational people to reject it.

Six cases demonstrate that rational people have admitted this possibility.

The first is that those who affirm that the world came into being—namely, the Muslims—say that Allah acted at

لا بد له من سبب، فاعترض على ذلك بأنه: (لم قلتم: إن الممكن لا بد له من سبب؟. ثم هنا نظران: أحدهما: أن نقول: أنتم في هذا المقام بين أمرين: إما أن تدعوا الضرورة فيه أو النظر. ودعوى الضرورة باطل لوجهين: أحدهما أنا إذا عرضنا على العقل أن الممكن لا يترجح أحد طرفيه إلا بمرجح، وعرضنا أيضاً قولنا: إن الواحد نصف الأثنين، لم نجد القضية الأولى في قوة القضية الثانية. وثانيهما: أن العقلاء جوزوا وقوع الممكن لا عن سبب، ولو كان ذلك ضرورياً لاستحال من العقلاء دفعه. بيان أن العقلاء جوزوا ذلك صور ست: أحدها: أن القائلين بحدوث العالم، وهم المسلمون، يقولون: إن الله فعل في

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