It is well known that someone who observes things that come into being, before knowing that they have a maker, does not know them to be a work or the product of an agent, such that knowing one would entail knowing the other. Unless he knows that whatever comes into being must have someone who brings it into being, he does not know these things to have been produced or made, let alone know that they have a maker and agent. Once he knows that they have been made and produced, however, he cannot fail to know that they have a maker and agent.

This is clarified by the fact that people’s knowledge that a work requires a maker is no weaker than their knowledge that a maker must have a work. Indeed, their knowledge of the former may be stronger than their knowledge of the latter. What he meant by his statement was that a maker cannot be a maker without a work, and an agent cannot be an agent without an act. This is correct.

But this is no clearer than the fact that a made thing cannot be made without a maker, a product cannot be produced without an agent, an act cannot be an act without an agent, and a work cannot be a work without a maker. Indeed, when people see something that has come into being, they know through reason that it must have an agent who brought it into being. Yet they may see something capable of acting without knowing whether it has done anything or not. His argument thus explains what is clearer and more evident by what is less clear, even though they themselves disallow defining what is more evident by what is less clear.

We have already said that an approach like this may be used when the person being addressed is ignorant, obstinate, or the like.