and more evident than reason’s knowledge that singling out one of two like things for something rather than the other requires a specifying cause. Whoever properly conceives these two propositions cannot be certain of the second while doubting the first. Indeed, he may fail to conceive one of them properly.

Do you not see that if someone who accepts the second proposition is asked, “Why do you say that bringing something forward or delaying it necessarily requires someone to bring it forward or delay it?” he returns to his sound natural disposition and judges accordingly? The most he can say is: “Of things that are equal, none can prevail over another without a determining cause.”

Now, suppose someone were to say: “Why do you say that? And why should it not be possible for this to prevail over that except through a determining cause in the first place? And why should it not possess its particular characteristics without any specifying cause whatsoever?” His rejection of this claim would be less emphatic than his rejection of someone who said: “Why do you say that these things cannot come into being without an originator? These arrangements and compositions came into being after not existing, without anyone to arrange or compose them.”

For one of two equal things that come into being to prevail over the other without a determining cause is an instance of something coming into being without an originator. Thus, if reason allows something to come into being without an originator, it also allows one of two like things to come into being rather than the other, without a cause specifying its coming into being.