the more direct approaches, which are shorter and more conclusive, may be because the person debating them refuses to acknowledge the validity of these direct, clear, and conclusive approaches—either out of obstinacy or because a misconception has arisen in his mind and corrupted his reason and natural disposition, as frequently happens to such people. With someone like this, it becomes necessary to turn to a lengthy, subtle argument whose premises he accepts one by one, until the conclusion binds him regardless of his wishes—even though the premises he rejected are clearer and more conclusive than those he accepted. Yet this is often necessary when addressing people. How many a person rejects the testimony of upright witnesses whose truthfulness is beyond doubt, yet accepts the testimony of those less trustworthy, either out of ignorance or injustice!

Likewise, how many people reject mass-transmitted, widely circulated reports, yet accept the report of someone they think well of because they believe he would not lie! How many reject what is known through scriptural and rational evidence, yet accept it after seeing a dream indicating its truth, or hearing it from someone they think well of, because they place greater trust in the latter than in the former! How many reject the texts of the Quran and Sunnah until their shaykh or imam says something consistent with them, only then accepting them! Their minds have become accustomed to accepting the words of the person they revere, but not to receiving knowledge from the Quran and Sunnah. Examples of this abound.

Similarly, many people become accustomed to a particular mode of reasoning and argument. When knowledge reaches them in that form, they accept it; when it reaches them in another form, they do not