upon an originator by arguing that this involves singling out one of two possible alternatives, and that such specification necessarily requires one who specifies. For them, this applies exclusively to things that come into being. They do not conceive of an eternal contingent being, such that they might argue from the dependence of a contingent being whose two alternatives are equally possible upon a determining factor that favors one of them, or favors its existence.

Al-Qādī Abū Bakr explained that the examples mentioned—bricks becoming a building and yarn becoming a garment—were given only because this is readily apparent to ordinary people and scholars alike, not because one case is inferred by analogy with the other.

Many Muʿtazilites, such as Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim, establish this by analogy with human acts. They say:

“Just as writing necessarily requires a writer, and a building necessarily requires a builder, so too a body that comes into being necessarily requires an agent, on account of the feature common to both. For the cause that makes the original case, upon which the analogy is based, dependent upon an agent is also present in the new case to which the analogy is applied: the original case depends upon an agent only because it came into being, and this is also true of the new case…”

And so on through the rest of their familiar discussion of such matters.

Al-Qādī Abū Bakr explained that there is no need for this; rather, the dependence of one is just like that of the other. He established this for all the cases through the approach he mentioned, namely, his statement:

“Because