whatever comes earlier should do so by virtue of itself, or whatever comes later should do so by virtue of itself. Nor can whatever comes earlier do so because of a cause inhering in it, for—if that cause does not depend upon one who brings it into existence—it has no greater claim to that cause’s existence within it than anything else does.

The same applies to the existence of all other causes of its kind in everything capable of bearing causes of that class which necessitate precedence—that is, existence at the particular time under discussion. Thus, all would exist simultaneously, and none would come after another, since they can bear the factors necessitating their existence and are alike.

Moreover, if the substances and parts of al-sawā’ that come earlier did so because of a cause, and those that come later did so because of a cause, the cause of precedence would precede the cause of coming later, since it would exist together with the earlier thing, which precedes the later one.

If that were so, one of the two causes would likewise have to precede the other because of a cause. For the causes of precedence and of coming later must be of the same kind, since both are instances of coming into being and existence for the thing that comes into being and exists, even if they were established as an entity of some kind.

We have already explained that neither of two like things can precede the other by virtue of itself or its kind.

And the existence of two things at different times does not remove