the book—that knowledge of the impossibility of something made coming into being without a maker is apprehended as self-evident and its truth known through sensory perception. Rather, it is apprehended by inference. When a parallel to what he doubts, a counterpart to what he is uncertain about, becomes established in the mind of someone who might doubt this question and the maker of things beyond his observation, he refers the doubtful case back to it, taking it as a basis for establishing what needs to be established and clarifying what it is hoped may be clarified for him.”

He said:

“His statement, ‘If someone were to wait for manufactured objects to come together without a maker, he would be feigning ignorance,’ is correct. Something made cannot come into being except through a maker, just as reason cannot conceive of a maker with nothing made by him, or a writer with nothing written by him. The dependence of something made upon its maker is thus like the dependence of a maker, in his capacity as a maker, upon the existence of what he makes. One is as rationally impossible as the other.”

He said:

“This is the essential point on which this proof rests. We mention various kinds of workmanship only to make the point easier to grasp. The purpose of mentioning them is not to restrict dependence upon a maker to these particular examples; rather, the intention is to establish that all made things must depend upon a maker who made them. Understand this.”

He continued with further remarks until he said:

“If someone asks: ‘What, then, is the evidence now