of whisperings and false thoughts has no fixed limit, and varies according to people’s circumstances.

As for Ibn ʿAqīl’s statement:

“It is beyond the intellect’s capacity to grasp the wisdom that Allah alone possesses ...”

—and the remainder of his remarks—all of this concerns final causes, the wisdom behind actions and their consequences, and questions of predestination and the attribution of justice or injustice to Allah. Because of his extensive study of the Muʿtazilah’s books and the works opposing them, this principle assumed great importance for Ibn ʿAqīl. It is among the most significant principles over which people’s discussions have branched out in different directions.

Groups affiliated with hadith and the Sunnah—such as al-Ashʿarī, Judge Abū Bakr, and those who agreed with their fundamental position, even if their formulations differed, such as Judge Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn al-Zāghūnī, along with groups whose number Allah alone knows—denied altogether that divine acts have purposes. They affirmed nothing but sheer will, and did not acknowledge in created things or prescribed commands any purposes for which creation and command took place, together with the other implications of their position.

The Muʿtazilah affirm an account of purpose that is contradictory both in its foundations and in its ramifications. They affirm that the Agent acts for a purpose, yet that no wise end accrues to Him. They then claim that, in the case of every individual servant,