their own associates and others, are disputing with them not over what has been established as knowable by reason alone, but over something else—as becomes clear if much of the writings of those associates whom these men oppose is carefully considered.

What those scholars meant when they said that knowledge is attained through revelation is not what they agreed could be attained only through reason, as al-Sharīf Abū ‘Alī ibn Abī Mūsā and others have explained.

We shall quote some of their statements, Allah Most High willing. Their disagreement with many of their own associates may therefore be verbal or substantive. For people dispute every one of the premises by which they restrict knowledge to their own method, though those raising the objections differ.

All of this assumes that revelation’s function as evidence consists merely in the report of a truthful informant, as these men use the term.

But if it is understood that revelation provides evidence through reports and also by directing people to rational proofs, drawing their attention to them, and explaining them, and that, just as people benefit from the words of