false.

Thus, one group restricts knowledge in general to a particular sequence; another restricts knowledge of Allah and of the truthfulness of His messengers to a particular sequence; and another restricts drawing near to Allah to a particular sequence. Although all these accounts contain both truth and falsehood, whatever truth they contain does not justify such restriction. Rather, it describes particular people. The paths to knowledge and spiritual states, their causes, and their sequences are far too broad to be confined to some of these methods.

For this reason, the messengers—may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon them—would command people to pursue the desired ends: faith in Allah and His Messenger, and fear of Him. They would explain the stronger and more beneficial paths and means of attaining these ends.

The adherents of innovation who oppose them do the reverse: they command people to undertake preliminary steps and starting points, and prescribe those that are weaker and more harmful.

Whoever follows the prophets neither goes astray nor becomes wretched, whereas whoever follows these people is astray and wretched.

For the propositions these people advance contain falsehoods—lies and fabrications—in numbers that Allah alone can count, even though the person asserting them may not know that they are lies and fabrications, but instead believes them to be true.

Since people differ in what is obligatory for them and in the order of their obligations, and differ in what they attain and in the order of their attainments, what is particular to some cannot be treated as applying to them all.

Much of the error in this matter arises precisely in this way: someone describes the path of a particular group, then makes it a universal rule, regarding anyone who does not follow it as astray. Yet that path may either be mistaken or