been preceded by doubt or inquiry.

A person may already know it and nevertheless examine another proof because of his interest in that evidence. Many proofs may converge on the same conclusion. Yet these people could not escape this objectionable consequence: they made reasoning obligatory, but making it obligatory entailed the absence of knowledge of what the evidence establishes. The person reasoning would therefore be seeking knowledge and would necessarily be in doubt.

Thus, they came to impose on every Muslim the requirement that his faith cannot be complete until he experiences doubt about Allah and His Messenger after reaching puberty—whether they made such doubt obligatory in itself or said that it necessarily follows from what is obligatory.

Another of their errors is this: even supposing that knowledge can be attained only through reasoning, this does not require reasoning to be delayed until puberty. Reasoning before then is possible; indeed, it actually occurs. Knowledge would therefore already have been attained through that reasoning, even though it was not obligatory. Likewise, if a child learns the Opening Chapter of the Quran and how to pray before puberty, this learning achieves the purpose of the obligation that applies after puberty. Reasoning is obligatory only as a means to an end, so undertaking it before it becomes obligatory is all the more conducive to attaining the intended end.

A parallel case is that of a child performing ablution before puberty, or an adult doing so before the time for prayer begins. This achieves the purpose of the obligation that applies upon reaching puberty or when the prayer time begins.

The discussion of this question has many ramifications, and it has been addressed elsewhere. The purpose here is to explain the ways in which many scholars establish the truthfulness of the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

A thorough examination of this question involves several issues, including whether