engage in reasoning in order to recognize the truth and follow it.

The second is that he is required to follow the truth and embrace Islam, then establish sound knowledge through reasoning and inference, to the minimum extent sufficient for him.”

His followers and others have disagreed over whether reasoning concerning the foundations of religion is an individual obligation or a collective obligation. Among those who do not consider it an individual obligation, some say that what is obligatory is firm conviction. Others say that knowledge, rather, is obligatory, but that it can be attained without such reasoning. This has been mentioned by several speculative thinkers among the Ash‘arīs and others, such as al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and others.

Those who consider it an individual obligation disagree on two positions: is faith valid without it, though the person who neglects it is sinful, or is faith invalid without it?

Those who make it a condition of faith, and those who make it obligatory without making it a condition, consider general reasoning sufficient, without requiring the ability to articulate and explain it. Only a small minority of speculative theologians have required such articulation and explanation.

There is no doubt that the believers in the time of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and in the time of the Companions and their successors, were not commanded to undertake the reasoning described by the proponents of innovated speculative theology, such as the method based on accidents and bodies.

But should it be said that firm conviction alone was sufficient for them? Or must there be knowledge attained through reasoning? Or can necessary knowledge be attained without the method of reasoning? These are matters over which there has been disagreement.