cause is the same as the argument concerning this one. Nor can these events have proceeded from a contingent being that has no cause, for a contingent being cannot exist of itself: it must have something that brings it into existence, whether or not this is called a cause. Nor can they have proceeded from a being contingent in itself, for that contingent being’s bringing them into existence is itself something contingent that comes into being.

It must therefore have something that brings it about. If, on their principles, events cannot proceed from the necessarily existent complete cause, whether through an intermediary or without one, then they likewise cannot proceed from a contingent being with no necessitating cause, or from a necessitating agent whose action does not depend upon that which is necessarily existent in itself. Their position thus entails that these events have no agent.

The alternatives are exhaustive, as may be explained as follows: the originator of events is either that which is necessarily existent in itself, acting through an intermediary or without one, or something that is not necessarily existent in itself. Whatever is not necessarily existent in itself is contingent. A contingent being either has something that brings it into existence or does not. The second alternative is impossible. Under the first alternative, its very act of bringing things into existence is itself something contingent that comes into being, and must therefore have something that brings it about.

It is thus clear that things which come into being must have an originator that is necessarily existent in itself, but is not a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect. This invalidates the foundation of their position.

This is the position of their most accomplished thinkers, such as Ibn Sīnā and others like him, who say that it proceeded from an agent that necessitates its effects by its very essence. This position is also attributed to Proclus. As for Aristotle and his followers, they hold that the First neither necessitates anything nor does anything; rather,