of intoxicants under the designation “wine,” and types of transactions under the designations “usury” and “gambling,” and similar cases involving the inclusion of particular instances within a class, or a specific class within a broader one.

This exercise of independent judgment is agreed upon by the scholars and is indispensable in every religious law. The most the Lawgiver can do is state rulings using general, comprehensive terms; it then remains necessary to ascertain which more specific classes and particular instances fall within them.

Some leading scholars who affirm analogical reasoning have invoked reasoning of this kind as evidence for it, noting that the noble Quran employs it concerning the direction of prayer, compensation for game, a person’s moral integrity, and similar matters.

This, however, provides no evidence for their claim, since reasoning of this kind is undisputed and indispensable. A ruling cannot be established for a class—or a particular instance—without it.

Those who reject analogical reasoning do not call this analogy. If someone does call it analogy, the disagreement is merely verbal.

More precisely, including particular instances within the general meaning conveyed by the revealed wording is reasoning by subsumption, whereas comparing particular instances or classes with one another is reasoning by analogy. Yet the wording’s general scope, encompassing both cases, dispenses with the need for reasoning by analogy.