by means of innovated theological discourse that entails contradicting the revealed texts—his account is correct.

I have examined this across most areas of discussion and found it to be so. Indeed, I have found that the positions of all the innovators necessarily entail a failure to affirm, in many matters, either the Quran’s revelation or its explanation and interpretation. Knowledge—and faith—entails affirming the revelation and the interpretation it indicates. There is no innovation of the Jahmiyyah and their offshoots in which they have not said something about the Quran that undermines its revelation, and something about its meanings that undermines its explanation and interpretation.

Whoever examines the methods by which the Mu‘tazilah and others refuted the materialists, philosophers, and others concerning their disagreements with the Muslims will see that they based their own departures from the revealed texts on rationally unsound principles. Through these, they neither defeated the enemies of the religion nor remained steadfast in loyalty to the Sunnah and adherence to the path of the believers. This is what they did with the arguments from accidents, composition, and particularization.

Likewise, those among the Kullābiyyah and others who debated them over their departures from the Sunnah concerning the divine attributes, divine decree, and other matters based much of their rebuttal on unsound principles. These were either principles introduced by their opponents which they accepted—as some accepted their arguments from accidents, composition, and the like—or principles with which they opposed them, countering falsehood with falsehood. This is what they did concerning divine decree, divine promise and threat, and questions of names and rulings. The former denied divine decree, held that Allah was obliged to carry out His threats, and judged Allah by analogy with His creation regarding what is good and evil, whereas the latter denied Allah’s wisdom