But these thinkers did not follow the Quran’s method in two respects:

First, they held that what comes into being consists only of accidents, not subsisting entities, as al-Rāzī and others did. Nevertheless, al-Rāzī and others used this to establish the existence of the Creator. Their proof was therefore valid in itself, despite its shortcomings in that respect and in reducing it to the argument from contingency.

Second is what al-Ash'arī mentioned: he used this to establish that the substrate of these properties and accidents came into being, on the premise that what comes into being is a form that is an accident and has a substrate. Thus, the bodies that are the substrates of these accidents must themselves have come into being. This can only be established by demonstrating the impossibility of a beginningless succession of events. Then, if he wishes to use this to establish that all other bodies came into being, he must base his argument on the premise that all bodies are alike.

These are three premises that most rational people dispute; indeed, they demonstrate their falsity by the clear dictates of reason. This method is therefore of the same kind as that of the Mu'tazilah.

Al-Ash'arī’s purpose, however, was to show that this method spares people the need for that lengthy, obscure method, with its many premises over which disputes arise. If both methods rest on the impossibility of a beginningless succession of events, and this method does not require what the other requires, then this method would be more direct and easier. Thus, al-Ash'arī’s debate with the Mu'tazilah concerning this method is of the same kind as his discussions