I say:

This argument rests on the premise that bodies are alike. Others have demonstrated its invalidity, as has al-Rāzī himself; indeed, most rational thinkers regard it as invalid. This has been explained elsewhere in a manner that leaves no doubt in the heart.

Al-Rāzī said:

“The fourth approach is to infer the existence of the Maker from the coming into being of attributes and accidents. Let us consider accidents that no human being can produce, such as a drop of semen whose parts are alike becoming a human being. If these configurations are accidents that come into being, and a human being is incapable of producing them, there must be another agent. Whoever maintains that it is self-evident that what is brought into being needs an agent maintains that this is self-evident here as well. Whoever bases this on contingency, or on an analogy with the coming into being of entities, applies the same reasoning to the coming into being of attributes.”

He said:

“The difference between inferring from the contingency of attributes and inferring from their coming into being is that the former entails that the agent is not a body, whereas the latter does not.”

I say:

We have stated in several places that this approach is sound, but