[Example: Discussion of Seeing Allah]

The point here is that when those who deny seeing Allah—the Jahmiyyah, the Muʿtazilah, and others—say that affirming it entails that Allah is a body, which they deny, and claim that reason establishes both premises, it becomes necessary to demonstrate the invalidity of both premises or of one of them. Thus, one must refute either the asserted entailment itself, the denial of its consequence, or both premises together.

Here, those who affirm seeing Allah followed different approaches.

One group disputed the first premise, including al-Ashʿarī and others like him. This is the position al-Ashʿarī reported from the people of hadith and the adherents of the Sunnah. They said:

“We do not concede that everything that can be seen must be a body.”

Those who deny seeing Allah replied:

“For everything that can be seen is in a direction, and whatever is in a direction is a body.”

Those who deny that Allah is a body then divided into two groups. One said:

“We do not concede that everything that can be seen is in a direction.”

The other said:

“We do not concede that everything in a direction is a body.”

Those who deny seeing Allah claimed that both premises are necessarily known, and that anyone disputing them is obstinately denying what is evident.

This is the well-known debate between the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿarīs. Consequently, the astute among the later Ashʿarīs came to deny seeing Allah and to agree with the Muʿtazilah. When they affirm it in conformity with the people of the Sunnah, they interpret it as the Muʿtazilah do, saying:

“The dispute between us and the Muʿtazilah is merely verbal.”

Another group disputed the second premise—the denial of the consequence—including the Hishāmiyyah, the Karrāmiyyah, and others. The Muʿtazilah and those who agreed with them began to denounce these groups. Although these groups’ position contains innovation and error, the position of the Muʿtazilah contains more innovation and error than theirs.