abstract universals as things existing in external reality, but contradicted themselves by distinguishing existence from subsistence.

The point is that all these groups share in affirming things that they claim exist in external reality, yet only a small minority of people can conceive of them, let alone have familiar, widely used words in the language denote them.

There is no doubt that they have erred concerning intelligible meanings, and then concerning what spoken words signify.

It thus becomes clear to you that their position involves misrepresenting language and reason in the same way that it involves misrepresenting revelation. They cannot claim that revelation supports their position in any way, whether literally or figuratively.

If we wish to demonstrate that the text does not signify what they claim is meant by ‘one’, there are several ways to do so:

First: This word has only been used for what they deny, not for what they affirm.

Second: We can demonstrate that what they affirm does not exist in external reality. In that case, no statement can indicate the existence of what does not exist.

Third: People in general—Arabs and non-Arabs alike—cannot conceive of what they describe. Thus, the word cannot have been coined to denote it or signify it, even if it exists.

Nor can it be said, ‘Assuming that it exists, the word “one” encompasses it,’ because, as explained above, what a word familiar to specialists and the general public denotes cannot be something that only specialists can conceive of.

The fourth way: Assuming that it encompasses both what they affirm and what they deny, there is no doubt that its applicability to what