he is told:

“In purely rational matters, terminology is immaterial. If reason establishes a meaning as true, it may not be denied merely because someone expresses it in certain terms, whatever those terms may be. Likewise, if reason establishes a meaning as false, it may not be affirmed merely because someone expresses it in certain terms.”

The truth of the meaning he has denied and designated by his technical expressions should then be demonstrated to him through reason.

In discussing matters with him, these expressions may be used in accordance with that denier’s terminology and language, even though the person using them would not consider their use permissible outside this context.

For example, a Rāfidī (rejectionist) might say:

“You are Nāsibīs: you show hostility toward Muhammad’s family.”

He is told:

“We maintain allegiance to both the Companions and the Prophet’s relatives.”

He replies:

“There can be no allegiance without disavowal. Whoever does not disavow the Companions has no allegiance to the Prophet’s relatives and therefore shows hostility toward them.”

He is then told:

“Suppose this is called nasb. Why, then, do you say that it is forbidden? You have no evidence for condemning nasb in this sense, just as there is no evidence for condemning rafd when it means allegiance to the Prophet’s household, provided that a person maintains allegiance to them as Allah and His Messenger love.”

An example of this is the verse:

“If loving Muhammad’s family is rafd,
Let mankind and jinn bear witness that I am a Rāfidī.”

Another poet says:

“If allegiance to the Companions is nasb,
Then I am, as they claim, a Nāsibī.
And if allegiance to all is rafd,
May rafd never leave my side.”

[Expressions Are of Two Kinds. The First Kind]

Expressions are of two kinds.

The first kind

The fundamental principle in this matter is that expressions are of two kinds: