—Moses and Aaron—were sons of ‘Imrān, the shared use of the name ‘Imrān—as is commonly the case with personal names—gave rise to the misconception. Eventually, al-Mughīrah asked the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about this, and he replied:

“Why did you not tell them that they used to name people after their prophets and the righteous who came before them? This Aaron was a man among the Children of Israel whom they named after the prophet Aaron.”

If they would challenge him with objections like this, how could they refrain from challenging him if the message he conveyed, in its apparent meaning—indeed, its explicit meaning, which admits of no alternative interpretation—contradicted plain reason, or even the very basis upon which his truthfulness and that of the prophets before him are known?

Why did the People of the Book not say to him: “What you have brought undermines the prophethood of the prophets before you. We can only believe you on the basis of rational propositions through which the truthfulness of the messengers is known, yet what you have made public, explained to people, and told them contradicts the rational principles by which we recognize the prophets as truthful”?

Know that whoever examines this matter and its implications closely will arrive at momentous conclusions:

The claim is false that the truth of revelation can only be established through rational propositions that contradict the apparent meaning of what Allah and His Messenger have reported.

Indeed, the claim that plain reason contradicts these reports is itself false.