Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (7/67)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

believers in him and unbelievers—people almost beyond counting—who raised objections that did not apply to his words.

These objections arose solely from the objectors’ ignorance. Nothing in the apparent sense, import, or meaning of what he said to them conflicted with sound reason. Rather, his opponents used their reasoning to challenge things that warranted no objection. Had the apparent meaning of anything he conveyed to them from Allah concerning His names, attributes, or other matters contradicted sound reason, it would have been far more deserving of objection. In the ordinary course of events, it would have been impossible for no one to challenge such a thing, whether to reject and impugn it or to seek clarification and guidance. How much more so if it contradicted the rational premises through which they had come to know that he was a prophet and Allah’s Messenger to them? Objections on these grounds would then have been all the more likely from unbelievers and Muslims alike.

The unbelievers would have said to him: “We can know that you are truthful only by knowing, through our reason, certain things that contradict what is understood from the apparent meaning of what you tell us. Anyone who believes you would therefore be contradicting himself and making a mockery of the matter: he could not accept some of your reports without rejecting others. This is not the conduct of those who are consistently knowledgeable and truthful, but of someone who sometimes lies and sometimes tells the truth, or is sometimes right and sometimes mistaken.”

As for the Muslims who outwardly professed Islam, there were hypocrites among them, and among the believers were those who readily listened to them. They would seize upon the slightest specious argument to sow doubt and misgiving in the believers’ hearts. Among them were men of knowledge, intelligence, and distinction, who read books and studied with the People of the Book, such as Abū ‘Ām the evildoer, who was known as Abū ‘Āmir the Monk, for whom the hypocrites established the mosque of harm.

المؤمنين به والكفار من لا يكاد يحصى معارضة لا ترد عليه. ولم تكن إلا من جهل المعارض، ولم يكن في ظاهر الكلام الذي يقوله لهم ومفهومه ومعناه ما يخالفه صريح المعقول، بل كان المعارضون يعارضون بعقولهم ما لا يستحق المعارضة، فلو كان فيما بلغهم إياه عن الله، من أسمائه وصفاته ونحو ذلك، ما يخالف ظاهره صريح المعقول، لكان هذا أحق بالمعارضة، وكان يمتنع في مستمر العادة أن مثل هذا لا يعارضه أحد: لا معارضة دافع طاعن، ولا معارضة مستشكل مسترشد، فكيف إذا كان ذلك يعارض القضايا العقلية التي بها علموا نبوته، وأنه رسول الله إليهم؟ فكانت تكون المعارضة بذلك أولى أن تقع من الكفار والمسلمين. أما الكفار فيقولون له: نحن لا نعلم صدقك إلا بأن نعلم بعقولنا أموراً تناقض ما يفهم ويظهر مما تخبرنا به، فالمصدق لك يكون متناقضاً متلاعباً، لا يمكنه أن يقبل بعض أخبارك إلا برد بعضها، وهذا ليس فعل العالمين الصادقين دائماً، بل فعل من يكذب تارة ويصدق أخرى، أو يصيب تارة ويخطئ أخرى. وأما المسلمون المظهرون للإسلام فقد كان فيهم منافقون، وفي المؤمنين سماعون لهم يتعلقون بأدنى شبهة يوقعون بها الشك والريب في قلوب المؤمنين، وكان فيهم من له معرفة وذكاء وفضيلة وقراءة للكتب ومدارسة لأهل الكتاب، مثل أبي عام الفاسق، الذي كان يقال له أبو عامر الراهب، الذي أتخذ له المنافقون مسجد الضرار.