dispute whether an unqualified command entails obligation. Yet no one disputes that when he makes clear that a command imposes an obligation, he must be obeyed, or that when he explicitly imposes an obligation from the outset, he must be obeyed.

Rather, their disagreement concerns what he intends by an unqualified command: does it establish that he intends to impose an obligation? This is a disagreement about knowing his intent, not about the obligation to obey him in matters he intends to make obligatory. None disputes the latter except one who denies his truthfulness.

The point is that his prohibition is binding upon the Muslim community, whereas, by the community’s unanimous agreement, an action of his may be specific to him.

Indeed, they have disagreed over whether the ruling attached to his actions extends to others, as is well known. Thus, when he issues commands or prohibitions to the Muslims whose intent they understand, none of them may counter these by appealing to his actions, by the unanimous agreement of the scholars. They discuss conflicts between what his words and actions indicate only when they do not know what he intends by his words. For example, they have discussed “his prohibition against facing the direction of prayer or turning one’s back to it while defecating or urinating,” “although Ibn ‘Umar saw him facing Syria, with his back toward the Kaaba, while relieving himself.”

Here, some may think that his prohibition is not general, but applies specifically when there is no barrier, and thus reconcile his words and actions. Others may think there is a distinction between facing the direction of prayer and turning one’s back to it, while others may think that one of the two has been abrogated because they believe them to conflict,