among rational people, whether they maintain that there is an agent acting by choice or a necessitating cause. Those who maintain a necessitating cause say that it necessitated the existence of the world in this spatial locus rather than another. As for the view that there is an agent acting by choice, the matter is clear. Since preference for some spatial loci over others is agreed upon among rational people, there is nothing objectionable in it.

If it is said, “This is preference for some over others in the case of a contingent being,” the reply is:

“If this is permissible for a contingent being, it is all the more permissible for the Necessary Being. For if the determining factor necessitates by its very essence, its giving preference to what relates to itself is more fitting than its giving preference to what relates to something else. And if it is an agent acting by choice, its choosing what relates to itself is more fitting than its choosing what relates to its outward aspect.”

If it is said, “This entails that voluntary acts subsist in His essence,” the reply is:

“It has already been established that they acknowledge this, and it is a necessary implication of the positions held by rational people generally.”

[Fourth ground]

It may be said: Those who affirm the divine attributes and hold that Allah, glorified be He, is above the world have two well-known views concerning the permissibility of acts subsisting in His essence and dependent upon His will and power.

The first is the view of those who say that this is not permissible, such as Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, and their followers among the adherents of Abū Hanīfa, Ahmad, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and others. They say: “His rising over the Throne is an effect He produces in the Throne.” They also say: “He created the world beneath Him without any movement or transition on His part from one spatial locus to another.” And they say: “He assigned the world to that particular spatial locus by His will and power.”