it is said that the occupant depends on the existence of a place that can be dispensed with. This, however, he did not include in his division.

If you mean that this entails the place’s independence of an agent that brings it into being, this does not follow on this assumption. All places depend on an agent that brings them into being, even if they are independent of an occupant.

If, on this assumption, His existence necessarily entails a spatial locus, He would not depend on something independent of Him. Rather, His existence would entail things inseparable from Him and dependent upon Him. This does not imply either that anything other than Him is independent of Him or that He depends on something independent of Him. Likewise, if the Essence necessarily entails the attributes, it does not follow that the attributes are more entitled to divinity.

This holds for those who affirm the attributes, as well as those Muslims who affirm states (aḥwāl). As for those who deny both, such as the eternalist philosophers, they hold that the existence of the Necessary Being entails the existence of contingent things, although those things depend upon Him while He is independent of them.

The crux of the objection is that he assumed His dependence on a place independent of Him. There is no doubt that this is invalid by agreement, because it entails that the Creator depends on something independent of Him, which contradicts the necessity of His existence.

But if what is called ‘place’ depends upon Him, and He is the One who originates and creates it, nothing in what he has said invalidates that.