And if a spatial locus is understood to be something nonexistent, it cannot be said that nonexistence—which is not a thing—is more deserving of divinity than a self-subsisting existent being. Thus, this argument is pure sophistry, and the expression “spatial locus” is ambiguous.

These people sometimes use “spatial locus” to mean something existent and sometimes something nonexistent. The same applies to “place,” although they generally mean something nonexistent by “spatial locus” and something existent by “place.” Hence they say: “The world is in a spatial locus, but not in a place.”

If this is so, whoever affirms a being occupying a nonexistent spatial locus does not thereby posit any other existent thing, whether that being is necessarily or contingently existent. It therefore does not follow that there must be anything that necessarily exists alongside it, let alone anything upon which it depends.

[The sixth response]

It may be said: This argument rests on the premise that everything that can be pointed to is composite, and that composition is impossible for the Necessary Being. If by composition you mean that something else composed it, or that it admits of separation into parts, or something similar, then the first premise is not conceded.

If, however, by composition you mean that one part can be pointed to rather than another, people offer two answers here.

The first is the position of those who say: “He is above the world but cannot be pointed to,” or: “He can be pointed to, but is not divisible into parts such that one could point to one part rather than another.” For pointing to one part rather than another is conceivable only in something that has parts. If something is posited that can be pointed to but is not divisible into parts, this cannot be said of it.