All these views have been judged invalid by one and the same arbiter. If its judgment is rejected in some cases, it must be rejected in all the others. This, then, is the answer to these people.

[Fifth Point]

The contention of those who say:

“We do not concede that being finite in some directions entails the untenable consequence he has mentioned.”

As for his statement:

“If the finite side shares the same essence as the infinite side, it could become infinite. Otherwise, composition necessarily follows, making separation and joining possible; and whatever is like this requires an agent to compose it.”

They reply:

“We do not concede that separation and joining are possible in this case, since that connection may be inseparable from the essence, just as inseparable attributes subsist in their subject. Moreover, sharing the same essence would entail the possibility of becoming infinite only if the determinate magnitude were not inseparable from its existence.”

If he says, “Everything possessing a particular magnitude is contingent,” this is the second premise, which has already been refuted. He therefore cannot establish the first premise except by means of the second. Thus, he has offered no proof that being finite entails being finite in every direction, except on the grounds that a particular specification requires a specifying agent.

If this is a sound proof, it suffices whether finitude is assumed in every direction or only in some. If it is not sound, his argument against being finite—whether in every direction or only in some—fails.